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The Social Security program was created in 1935 in order to protect individuals against the
financial devastation and destitution su↵ered su↵ered by the elderly in the early years of the
Great Depression (Altmeyer, 1966). Initially modest in scope, the program has grown to be
a pillar of the economy: 30% of Social Security recipients derive 90% of their income from
Social Security (Gruber, 2013). A central question in understanding how Social Security
a↵ects people and the economy as a whole is how it a↵ects private savings. However, until
recently, there has been a lack of convincing empirical evidence on this question.
Social Security insures individuals against loss of income when they retire, so from the
point of view of the worker, it functions as a sort of government-sponsored pension plan.
Individuals contribute premiums in the form of garnished wages—matched by employer
contributions—and collect benefits when they reach the age of 65.1 For an individual, saving
for retirement through Social Security is like saving through a private pension plan, though it
di↵ers from saving privately because Social Security benefits are illiquid prior to retirement.
However, unlike a pension plan, which invests the premiums individuals contribute,
Social Security uses the “premiums” collected to pay benefits to currently retired workers,
meaning that no money is actually saved. If individuals consider Social Security payments to
be a substitute for private savings and therefore decrease their saving by that amount, then
the amount paid into Social Security is “lost” from aggregate savings. From a macroeconomic
point of view, these lost savings mean lower economy-wide savings and lower GDP growth.
Hence, if the money collected by Social Security, which was 5% of GDP in 2014, were
privately invested, there would be non-negligible macroeconomic consequences.2
1Individuals may elect to begin receiving Social Security benefits as early as age 62. The size of benefits
are adjusted to take into account when an individual retires so as to not pay higher aggregate benefits to an
individual who retires earlier.
2https://www.nasi.org/learn/socialsecurity/economy-share
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Although the reasoning that Social Security reduces private savings is compelling, it
is also conceivable that Social Security induces individuals to save more. Because Social
Security brings individuals closer to their savings goals, they may choose to save the addi-
tional amount needed to reach a goal that might otherwise have seemed unattainable. Social
Security also could lead to an increase in savings because it changes familial relationships
with respect to retirement; that is, because Social Security provides financial support to
the elderly, adult children no longer feel responsible for their parents, meaning that those
parents must amass larger retirement savings during their lifetimes to support themselves
in retirement without assistance from their children. It is also possible that Social Security
has little to no e↵ect on savings, since some Social Security recipients have such constrained
liquidity during their lifetimes that they would be able to save very little in the absence of
Social Security (Munnell, 1974. Feldstein, 2002).
Understanding the relationship between Social Security and savings is of increasing
importance. Retirees are living longer than they did in previous generations, and therefore
need more savings to sustain their lengthened retirement. Further, the cost of living is
increasing for retirees, meaning that workers must set aside more per year than in the past.
Retirees are becoming less healthy, so they must have more savings to support their medical
expenses. Though retirement savings are becoming increasingly important, employers are
now less likely to provide pension plans for their employees, meaning that individuals are
more responsible for their own savings outside of Social Security. Further, Social Security
replacement rates have fallen over recent years, leading individual benefit levels to fall,
making an individual’s private savings choices of increasing importance (Poterba, 2014).
In this paper, I seek to provide new evidence concerning the e↵ect of Social Security
on savings. I use the unique situation provided by the phase-in of Social Security, which,
to my knowledge, has never been considered in the vast literature on this question. Though
2
contemporary Social Security covers essentially everyone and is uniform across the nation,
Social Security initially covered only individuals in certain occupations. In the 1950s, Social
Security was expanded to cover more occupations. I exploit variation from these occupational
expansions through di↵erence-in-di↵erences regressions to estimate the e↵ect of receiving
Social Security benefits on individuals’ private savings. Following this analysis, I examine
how the phase-in of Social Security interacted with Old Age Assistance, a preexisting old-
age-support program.
I employ of early iterations of the Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF), a dataset whose
contemporary iterations are often used but whose historic iterations are largely forgotten.
The SCF contains detailed information about individuals’ holdings in di↵erent forms of
saving accounts, checking accounts, bonds, stocks, housing stock, mortgage debt, and non-
mortgage debt. This data provides unique information about changes in individual’s assets
during a period of greatly changing social policy. I combine the SCF data with data on
Old Age Support programs from The Social Security Bulletin and Historical Statistics of the
United States.
An important paper in the literature on the e↵ect of Social Security on saving is Mar-
tin Feldstein’s 1974 Journal of Political Economy paper, in which, using time series data,
he estimates that the presence of Social Security depresses personal savings by between 30
and 50 percent. (Feldstein, 1974) Outside of the time-series literature, much of the previ-
ous empirical literature on the relationship between Social Security and saving follows the
approach of Martin Feldstein and Anthony Pellechio’s seminal (1979) paper which uses a
cross-sectional approach to estimate the e↵ect of Social Security on savings. With a sample
of men between ages 55 and 64, Feldstein and Pellechio estimate that each marginal dollar
of Social Security wealth crowds out seventy cents in private savings. (Feldstein, 1979) Fol-
lowing this paper, a flood of papers with varying levels of econometric sophistication use a
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similar empirical strategy and estimate a wide variety of di↵erent crowd-outs, though the
majority are between zero to fifty cents per dollar of Social Security. (Feldstein, 2004)
Despite the vast literature on the relationship between Social Security and savings, the
question remains unsettled. Because Social Security is universal in the sense that essentially
everyone is covered by Social Security, and is uniform in the sense that everyone receives a
Social Security benefit calculated from the same formula, identifying the relationship between
Social Security benefits and saving by regressing the stock of an individuals savings on the
present discounted value of their Social Security benefits will likely not reveal the causal
e↵ect of Social Security on savings. The very factors that led someone to have a particular
Social Security benefit are likely to also influence their savings choices. Individuals with
higher earnings during their lives mechanically have higher levels of Social Security benefits.
Individuals with higher incomes also tend to have higher levels of savings during their lives
for observable and unobservable reasons: perhaps they also have tastes for higher savings.
Because of unmeasurable and unobservable characteristics, cross-sectional estimates of the
impact of Social Security on savings are likely to be biased.
Recently, compelling literature on pension reform in Europe provides insights into how
Social Security might a↵ect savings in the United States. Two papers that exploit these
pension reforms are Attanasio and Rohwedder (2003) and Attanasio and Brugiavini (2003).
In Attanasio and Rohwedder (2003), the authors estimate the e↵ect of changes in pension
wealth of public-sector workers in the United Kingdom using variation from pension reforms
and indexation changes of the state’s pension system. There, the authors find that, for
individuals between ages 54 and 64, increasing pension wealth by £100 was related to a
reduction in private savings of £75. Attanasio and Brugiavini (2003) examine reforms to
the Italian pension system that impact people of di↵erent ages di↵erently. They find that
individuals, especially those closer to retirement ages, substitute pension wealth for private
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savings. Studies of this type cannot be conducted in the United States because the recent
adjustments to the Social Security benefit formula are not of similar magnitude to those in
Europe.
In this paper, contrary to previous research, I find mostly positive, albeit statistically
insignificant, point estimates on the e↵ect of receiving Social Security on savings. These
estimates may stem from a lack of power or from random noise in the data. However, it is
not inconceivable that the phase-in of Social Security did lead to an increase in savings. I will
elaborate on various reasons why the phase-in of Social Security might have had a positive
e↵ect on savings before empirically exploring one of these possibilities. Finding positive and
mostly insignificant e↵ects from the phase in of Social Security is not necessarily evidence
to the contrary to the notion that increasing the generosity of Social Security benefits would
depress savings. Rather it suggests that changing Social Security on the extensive margin is
di↵erent than changing Social Security on the intensive margin.
2 A Simple Model of Social Security and Savings
In order to illustrate the relationship between Social Security and savings, I present a two-
period model, in which individuals work and save in the first period, and retire in the second.
With this simple model, I seek to provide a theoretical basis for the intuition that Social
Security would crowd out private savings and demonstrate the complexity of the relationship.
This model closely follows that in Feldstein and Liebman’s (2002) chapter on Social Security
in the Handbook of Public Economics.
Consider an individual whose life is composed of two periods. In the first period, she
works, earning a wage of wage, and she saves Save. In the presence of Social Security, she
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faces a Social Security tax of   on her wages. Therefore, her consumption in Period 1 in the
presence of Social Security is
C1 = (1   )wage  Save.
rearranging terms, this is
Save = (1   )wage  C1.
In the second period, she does not work, so in the presence of Social Security, her consumption
is given by the present value of her savings and her Social Security benefit, SSB . I denote
the interest rate as r. Consumption in Period 2 is defined as
C2 = Save(1 + r) + SSB.
Substituting in the equation for Save from the first period, we can write this as
C2 = ((1   )wage  C1)(1 + r) + SSB
I define U1 to be the utility function for Period 1 and U2 to be the utility function for Period
2,3 so the lifetime utility function, LUF , is as follows:
LUF = U1(C1) + U2(C2)
I solve this individual’s utility maximization problem by di↵erentiating LUF with re-
spect to Save,  , and SSB which yields
w(U 001 )d   + [U
00
1 + (1 + r)
2 U2] dSave+ (1 + r)U 002 dSSB = 0
3Note that discounting is accounted for in U2.
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To simplify this optimization problem, assume that Social Security is actuarially fair,
that is, r = g where g is the growth rate of money individuals pay into the Social Security
system. So SSB = (1 + r) (wage) and d  = dSSB/(1 + r)wage. So we have dsave =
 1/(1 + r)dSSB. This implies that each expected dollar of Social Security is substituted
one-for-one for a discounted dollar of savings.
Figure (1) provides a graphic of this “base case”. Here, I show the individual’s con-
sumption and saving in period 1 and period 2 on the x-axis and y-axis respectively. Following
the derivation, the individual substitutes the present value of a dollar of Social Security for
a dollar of savings and maximizes her utility. This is best thought of as a one-for-one sub-
stitution between retirement savings in the form of an illiquid pension and Social Security
benefits because Social Security benefits are not a perfect substitute for private savings in a
saving account. Private savings are liquid and can be used to insure an individual against
risk during period 1 while Social Security benefits are illiquid and can only be used during
period 2.
By making small modifications to this framework, the one-for-one relationship between
the present value of Social Security and savings changes. If an individual knew she were to
receive a Social Security benefit larger in net present value than the present value she pays
into the system, then she would decrease her savings in the first period even farther than
in the base case, increasing her period 1 consumption. If the net present value of Social
Security benefits were smaller than the share of wages paid into the Social Security system,
the prediction for change in savings for the individual during the first period is ambiguous
and the change in savings in the model depends on the shape of her utility curve.
Along with changing private saving incentives, the presence of a Social Security system
also shifts labor market incentives. A large literature documents that retirement benefits
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may induce individuals to retire earlier, meaning that there are more years of retirement for
an individual to finance with savings (Feldstein, 2002. Fetter, 2016). Because Social Security
benefits are actuarially adjusted, an individual must save more during the first period in order
to finance a longer second period of retirement. The e↵ect of Social Security on savings then,
depends on both the theoretical reduction in private savings because of Social Security and
the theoretical increase in private savings from Social Security incentivizing individuals to
retire earlier.
It is also important to consider that Social Security is not perfectly actuarially adjusted;
individual’s future benefits are functions of current government policy, as well as their earn-
ings history. If an individual has little faith in the Social Security system and does not
believe that she will receive Social Security benefits when she retires, then she will likely
substantially reduce her period 1 consumption and her savings will be less depressed that
an individual who believes that Social Security in actuarially fair. Conversely, an individual
who has great faith in the government and in population growth might believe that her Social
Security will be more generous that the actuarially fair model I presented above, meaning
that she would save even less during period 1. Because Social Security is not perfectly ac-
tuarially adjusted, the model presented here is abstract and serves to develop an underlying
insight rather than to provide a firm prediction (Feldstein, 2002).
It is important to consider the myopia in models of the relationship between Social
Security and savings. In the above mentioned models, individuals demonstrate perfect fore-
sight when considering their future retirement benefits. That is, they perfectly adjust their
consumption in the first period such that they are maximizing their utility over their lifecy-
cle. This is an incredibly restrictive assumption; people neither have perfect foresight nor are
they perfectly myopic. Many individuals who depend on Social Security are severely liquid-
ity constrained as they work, and in the absence of Social Security, would use the additional
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income to consume a good for which they have a relatively inelastic demand. In a world
with myopia and liquidity constraints, individuals would save too little. This combination
of these factors likely contributed to the plight of the elderly during the Great Depression.
To determine how the presence of Social Security influences the economy as a whole, I
must consider changes in individuals savings simultaneously. Consider a base case where I
assume that each generation of workers has the same number of people and that there is no
wage growth in the economy. In the absence of Social Security in this model, the young will
consume C1 in period 1 while the old consume C2 in period 2. Because each generation has
the same number of people and there is no wage growth in this economy, the consumption
of C2 for the old will be exactly balanced by the savings of the young in period 1, therefore
leading to an economy with no net savings. Because in the base case version individuals
substitute dollar for dollar of Social Security and savings, the phase in of the Social Security
system will not move net savings of this economy from zero.
If I relax these assumptions and allow wage growth and population growth to be pos-
itive, individuals will receive Social Security benefits larger than what they paid into the
system, leading them to shift C1 out, leading to an aggregate fall in savings. Note that here,
individuals still substitute a dollar of Social Security for a dollar of savings, but aggregate
savings in the economy falls.
In this paper, I seek to empirically explore the prediction that the phase-in of a Social
Security system leads to decreases in individuals stocks of savings and do not address the
macroeconomic aspects of Social Security.
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3 The Phase-In of Social Security: Approach and Data
3.1 Identifying the E↵ect of the Phase in of Social Security
Social Security, in its modern form, originated in 1935 with the passage of the Social Security
Act. The Social Security Act included two programs which benefitted the elderly: Old
Age and Survivor’s Insurance (OASI), now called Social Security, and Old Age Assistance
(OAA), a means tested income supplement for the elderly.4 Figure 2 shows that growth of
per person OASI and OAA payments across time. Though OAA was initially the larger of
the two programs, by 1950, OASI became the larger and continued to dramatically expand
over the following decades while OAA remained comparatively small in size.
I will first estimate the e↵ect of receiving Social Security coverage on stocks of savings
using variation in the occupations that are covered by Social Security. Upon passage of the
Social Security Act, about 60% of the workforce was covered, particularly those working
in commerce or industry (Kollmann, 1996). The occupations initially covered by Social
Security were not randomly selected. Farm workers and domestic workers were not covered
by Social Security, in part because collecting an earnings tax and calculating benefits was
administratively di cult. A historical literature argues that Social Security initially did
not cover the entire workforce because politicians in the South sought to maintain a servile
black labor force working as farm and domestic workers and worried that expanding Social
Security coverage would lead to increased wages for black people. Hence, for the Social
Security Act to pass Congress, the legislation could not cover these groups (Alston, 1999.
Quadagno, 1988). During the period of this study, there were occupational expansions of
Social Security in 1950, 1954, and 1956, denoted by red lines in Figure 2.
4The1935 Social Security Act created Old Age Insurance. In 1939, Old Age Insurance became Old Age
and Survivor’s Insurance.
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The 1950 amendments to the Social Security Act, signed by President Truman on
August 28, 1950, expanded coverage to 8 million people, including non-self-employed farm
workers and some self-employed workers except doctors, lawyers, and engineers.5 Though the
legislation became e↵ective January 1st of 1951, the anticipation of coverage of these groups
began prior to the law’s enactment. The amendment was first introduced to the House
of Representatives in 1949 as two separate bills, H.R. 2892 and H.R. 2893, prior to being
combined into a single bill, H.R. 6000. H.R. 6000 first passed the House of Representatives
in October, 1949 and then passed the Senate, along with additional amendments, in June,
1950. It passed both Houses of Congress after further negotiation on August 16, 1950
and President Truman signed the Bill at the end of August (Altmeyer, 1966. Cohen, 1950.
Leibowitz, 1954). Because of the legislative lead-up to the Bill’s passage, workers who were to
gain coverage probably were aware that beginning in 1950, people in their occupation would
receive Social Security benefits upon retirement. Therefore, anticipatory e↵ects regarding
savings likely began in 1950 rather than 1951.
The 1954 amendment to the Social Security Act, signed by President Eisenhower
September 1st of 1954 and enacted January 1st of 1955, further extended coverage to self
employed farmers, more professional and self-employed workers who had previously not been
covered. Still excluded from Social Security were lawyers, medical professionals and some
other self employed, though state and government employees, except police and firemen were
able to opt into the program (Cohen, 1954. Kollmann, 1966. Marquis, 1954). Notably, state
and local employees had previously been covered by pensions. I do not have information
concerning these pensions and do not control for them in my analysis. As with the 1950
expansion, individuals likely learned in advance their occupations would be added to Social
Security coverage, so anticipatory e↵ects probably began in 1954 rather than 1955.
5Some self employed individuals outside of doctors, lawyers, and engineers were not covered in the 1950
expansion.
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The 1956 amendment to the Social Security Act, signed by President Eisenhower on
August 1st of 1956 and enacted January 1st of 1957, further extended coverage to uniformed
military servicemen, and most previously excluded professionals, except medical professionals
and lawyers, as well as farm owners and operators (Kollmann, 1996. Schottland, 1956). This
amendment granted coverage to approximately an additional 900,000 people. Just as with
the earlier amendments, individuals likely began to shift their behavior in 1956 rather than
1957.
I use this variation to compare changes in savings of those whose coverage status changed
as a result of the amendments to the changes in savings of those whose coverage status did
not change as a result of the amendments. For this empirical strategy to yield a causal e↵ect,
I argue that the timing of the occupational expansion was quasi-random, that is, the exact
timing of gaining Social Security coverage was random even if the expansion of the Social
Security system itself was not random. If individuals anticipated their occupation would
be by Social Security in advance to the legislation and previously adjusted their behavior
accordingly, the estimated e↵ect reported here would be biased towards zero.
In the final section of the paper, I will use variation from Old Age Assistance (OAA).6
OAA was a means-tested program with no pay-in requirement administered at the state
level that, broadly speaking, assisted people above the age of 65 living below a poverty
threshold by bringing their income up to the state-defined threshold. There is substantial
heterogeneity in income floor by OAA across states, so the average payment per individual
above age 65 varied greatly across states. For example, OAA payments in New England were
low relative to those in the West and the South West of the United States in 1949. Later
in this paper, I will explain how the means test of OAA and benefits from OASI interact to
influence the total change in per person public old age support payments which is suggestive
6Note that contemporary OAA is SSI.
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of heterogeneous treatment e↵ects by state for the phase in of Social Security.
3.2 Survey of Consumer Finances
The primary data source for this study is the Survey of Consumer Finance. Though con-
temporary data from the SCF is well known, the early data is underused. Between 1947 and
1963, the years I use for this study, the SCF was an annual survey taking detailed infor-
mation about respondents’ savings, assets, and debt featuring 1500 to 3000 respondents per
iteration. I use these years because 1947 was the first year in which the Survey of Consumer
Finances was conducted and I stop after the 1963 iteration because the unit of observation
changes thereafter. I exclude two survey years, 1960 and 1961, because 1960 is missing
sample weights and 1961 is missing many of the questions that I would need to construct
analogously defined variables.
The unit of observation of the SCF is the spending unit, defined as a group of related
people who live in a home together and pool at least half their income for the unit’s expendi-
tures. From this dataset, I have constructed consistent variables estimating stocks of assets,
income, and demographic characteristics over time.
3.3 Asset Variables
Figure 3 shows the mean of the dependent variables in this study across time. In this paper,
monetary values will be reported as 1960 dollars; one 1960 dollar is equal to 7.37 2010 dollars.
Panel (a) shows the mean value of net worth without housing, defined as the sum of holdings
in saving accounts, checking accounts, bonds, less non-mortgage debt restricted tho those
ages 25-64. As is clear in this figure, this measure of net worth is relatively stable across
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time, excluding 1955 where there is an unexplained increase in the data.7
The detail of this dataset allows me to further break down components of net worth.
Panel (b) of Figure 3 shows holdings in liquid assets, defined as the sum of holdings in saving
accounts, checking accounts, and bonds in the SCF.8 Panel (c) of Figure 3 shows holdings
in savings accounts, postal saving accounts, building and loan saving accounts, saving and
loan accounts, and checking accounts. This variable is also quite stable across time. Panel
(d) shows holdings in bonds defined as the sum of di↵erent bonds available in each year of
SCF data.9 This asset shows a strong downward trend over time. It is likely that holdings
in bonds were high in 1946 because of forced savings and buying of war bonds during World
War II. Over the following decades, individuals’ bonds may have matured, been called, or
perhaps sold for stocks in the booming post-war economy. Panel (e) shows average holdings
in net worth, inclusive of housing defined as non housing net worth plus home equity. This
asset grows substantially across the survey suggesting an accumulation of housing wealth
during this time period. Finally, panel (f) shows the share of the sample that owns stocks
during this time period. Just as housing wealth increased across the sample, so did the share
of individuals’ holding stocks.
I also observe individual’s flows of liquid assets between 1947 and 1951. It is important
to consider flows of savings in addition to stocks of savings because flows of savings are likely
to respond more quickly than stocks of saving. Summary statistics for the flows of liquid
assets for individuals between ages 45 and 64 are shown in Table 1. Because this measure is
incredibly variable, I report summary statistics of it in multiple forms. The first row of this
7I include year fixed e↵ects in all regressions which should control for this systematic di↵erence in 1955
8Liquid assets is a measure defined by the SCF that appears to have a constant definition across survey
years. I was able to closely recreate this variable as defined in the text.
9From 1946-1951, this is the sum of A-F Bonds and US Bonds. From 1952-1958, this is the sum of War
Bonds and US Bonds, from 1959 to 1962, this is defined as savings bonds. Note that A-F bonds are a type of
War Bonds. I am not certain that these are identical; however year e↵ects should remove unobserved fixed
systematic di↵erences across years.
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table reports the flow variable for liquid assets in 1960 dollars. Here, the mean liquid asset
flow in the sample is 70 dollars which is .8% of a standard deviation of the stock of liquid
assets. The median and modal liquid asset flow per year is zero.
The next row of this table shows the current years liquid asset flows as a percent of the
stock of the prior year liquid assets, defined as liquid asset flowliquid asset stock last year .The mean percentage
flow is 1.19%. Again this measure of liquid asset flows is highly variable; the minimum flow
as percentage of last years liquid assets is a -370% and the maximum flow as a percentage
of last years liquid assets is 6000%. It is quite peculiar that the minimum percentage liquid
asset flow is -370% as liquid assets are defined to be positive when flows are not. This
implies that individuals had a negative flow tremendously larger than the stock of asset. It
seems implausible that factors such as bank over-drafting could explain such a flow. Despite
this unexplained component of liquid asset flows, I still use the variable because it is a best
attempt at a measure that may be more responsive to Social Security coverage.
Because of the variability in this measure, I measure liquid asset flows in three other
ways to attempt to minimize the weight of the outliers. First, I create a dummy variable for
if an individual had a positive flow in liquid assets. Here, I estimate that 58% of individuals
had positive savings during this time period. Second, I compute which percentile of the
1949 liquid asset flows into which each liquid asset flow from other years falls.10 I use the
percentile distribution of 1949 because it was the year prior to the Social Security expansion.
As such, this measure shows how becoming covered by Social Security relates to ones place
in the pre-policy change distribution. Finally, I measure liquid asset flows as a fraction
of the individual’s total income in the current year, defined as liquid asset flowtotal income . On average,
individuals decreased flows as a share of income by 10%, though the median of this variable
10Note that the 33 to 64 percentiles of the 1949 percentile distribution are all zero liquid asset flows.
Because of this, I mechanically set these all equal to 49, which is the midpoint of the distribution.
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is 0%.
Figure 4 shows demographic variables for the sample. These figures are restricted to
individuals between 25-64. Panel (a) shows the average number of people in the spending unit
across years, which consistently grows across the sample. Panel (b) shows the share of the
sample whose respondent identifies as white. Panel (c) shows the share of the sample across
years whose highest level of education was attending or completing high school and Panel (d)
shows the share of the sample across years whose highest level of education was attending
or completing some college. Observe that the education levels of individuals consistently
increase across the sample. These variables will be included in a vector of controls in some
of the regression specifications as their inclusion might increase the precision of the point
estimates.
3.4 Occupations in the SCF
Creating mappings from the SCF occupation codes to occupations covered by Social Security
involved some discretion because the occupation codes did not remain consistent across
di↵erent years of the SCF, and therefore required me to create consistent occupational coding
across years. For example, the code “professional man” was used before 1950, but not
thereafter. It is not clear if these individuals should have received coverage in 1950 or in
1954 as some, but not all self-employed “professional men” received Social Security coverage
in 1950. After 1950, the detail in the occupation codings increased greatly. It is worth noting
that results are sensitive to alternate occupation codings.11 It is not obvious how to merge
together years with more or less detail in occupational coding.
Figure 5 shows the distribution of individuals by the year that they received Social
11The results presented code self employed professional individuals in higher status occupations as receiving
coverage in 1954 when it was unclear which year they should have received coverage.
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Security coverage. The red lines indicate the years 1950, 1954, and 1956, which are the
years in which the legislation expanding Social Security was passed. In this data, 74% of the
sample was always covered by Social Security, an additional 4% was covered in 1950, another
11% was covered in 1954, and another 12% was covered in 1956. These shares do not match
shares of the population that should have been covered by each occupational expansion; this
is either the result of my occupation coding or it is because the SCF was not representative
of the population. In this figure, the share of individuals in a certain occupation does not
appear to increase substantially prior to any of the occupational expansions. This alleviates
some concern about individuals switching occupations in order to receive Social Security
coverage.
4 Empirical Strategy and Results
4.1 Results from the full sample
My first empirical strategy compares changes stocks of savings for individuals who were
impacted by the expansions relative to individuals who were not impacted by the expansion
using the following regression:
outcomeiot = ✓t + ↵o +  1(treat)it + x⇣ + "it (1)
i indexes the individual, o indexes occupation, and t indexes time. ✓t and ↵o represent
year and occupation fixed e↵ects. x represents a vector of controls that includes a dummy
variable for if the respondent is white, a dummy variable indicating whether the head of
house is male, a variable for the number of individuals living in the house, and dummy
variables for levels of education of the respondent. 1(treat)it is an indicator variable that
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turns on if the individual’s occupation was legislated to be covered by year t. Though the
1950 occupational expansion took legislative e↵ect in January of 1951, this indicator variable
turns on in 1950 because I am interested in finding a behavioral response to the knowledge of
being covered by Social Security, and because this is an anticipatory e↵ect, I want to look for
an e↵ect as soon as individuals begin to anticipate a di↵erent package of retirement benefits.
As outcome variables, I will use net worth exclusive of housing, liquid assets, holdings in
savings and checking accounts, holdings in bonds, net worth inclusive of housing, and a
dummy variable for stock ownership.
For   to identify the causal e↵ect of being covered by Social Security on savings, it must
be the case that in the absence of a change in Social Security policy, the savings between
those whose coverage status changed and those whose coverage status remained unchanged
would have evolved on parallel trends. Note that the inclusion of a vector of controls is not
necessary for the causal identification, though it may increase the precision of the estimates.
A potential threat to identification is endogenous occupation choice. Suppose that in-
dividuals who are particularly zealous about savings switch occupations in order to receive
Social Security coverage. This would upwardly bias the e↵ect of Social Security on savings
because in the absence of Social Security, these individuals would still save more than in-
dividuals who would not switch occupations in order to become covered by Social Security.
Ideally, to solve this problem, I would use individuals’ occupations prior to the announcement
of which occupations are covered by Social Security or are to be covered in each expansion.
The SCF data does not allow me to use individual’s prior occupations because it does not
include them, although as previously noted, there does not appear to have been shifts in
occupational composition in the SCF surrounding occupational expansions easing the threat
of endogenous occupation choice.
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Table 2 reports results from these regressions of net worth, exclusive of housing. Here,
I estimate that, without controls, becoming covered by Social Security is related to an
increase in non-housing net worth of $183 for those ages 25-64, and that with controls,
becoming covered by Social Security is related to a $75 increase in net worth exclusive of
housing. After restricting to those 45-64, that is those who are close to retirement age, these
estimates both increase. Upon the inclusion of controls, for individuals 45-64, becoming
covered with Social Security is related to a $230 increase in non-housing net worth which is
a 2.5% increase of in standard deviation of non housing net worth.
Though these coe cients are all positive, I cannot reject a zero e↵ect of receiving Social
Security coverage at a conventional confidence level. Nevertheless, I can reject e↵ects outside
of a confidence interval at conventional levels of statistical significance. A 95% confidence
interval around the point estimate of  ˆ = 230.2 in column 4 of Table 1, is ( 287.24 
   747.64), so I can reject e↵ects outside of these bounds at conventional levels. More
intuitively, I can reject an e↵ect of the phase in of Social Security of outside of a 3.1% fall in
standard deviation of net worth not housing and an increase in savings outside of an 8.1%
increase in standard deviation of net worth non-housing, a relatively tight bound on the
e↵ect of becoming covered by Social Security.
Table 3 reports results from regression (1) for liquid assets. Here, for individuals 45-64,
becoming covered by Social Security after including a vector of controls is related to a $231
increase, or 3.8% of a standard deviation, increase in liquid assets. Just as with non-housing
net worth, the magnitudes of the e↵ects are larger when looking at those closer to retirement
age, and the magnitudes become less extreme upon the inclusion of controls. Though none
of the point estimates are statistically di↵erent from zero at conventional levels, I can reject
e↵ects of the phase in of Social Security outside of the interval [ 294.86, 757.26] at a 95%
confidence level which is the same as rejecting e↵ects of less than a 3% decrease of a standard
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deviation of liquid assets or more than an 9% increase of a standard deviation of liquid assets.
Table 4 reports results from the regressions on the sum on holdings in savings and
checking accounts. The point estimates for the sample with the wider age range are negative
while the point estimates restricted to those near retirement are positive. Column 4, my
preferred specification, estimates that being covered by Social Security is related to a $132.8
increase in saving and checking accounts which is 2% of a standard deviation increase. Using
the point estimate in column 4, I can reject e↵ects of the Social Security expansion outside of
3% of a standard deviation decrease in saving and checking accounts and a 7% of a standard
deviation increase in saving and checking account.
Table 5 reports regression results from holdings in bonds. Though the point estimates
in this table are negative, again none are statistically di↵erent from zero at conventional
levels. Using the point estimate from column 4—becoming covered by Social Security is
related to a $312.2 decrease in holdings in bonds—I can reject e↵ects of the phase in of
Social Security smaller that a $706.75 or 18.1% of a standard deviation decrease in bonds
associated with being covered by Social Security or larger than $82.248 or 2.1% of a standard
deviation increase in holdings in bonds associated with becoming covered by Social Security.
Table 6 report regression results from net worth inclusive of housing. In column 4, I
estimate that for individuals ages 45-64, conditional on a vector of controls, receiving Social
Security coverage is related to a $3632.8 increase in net worth inclusive of housing. At a
95% significance level, I can reject that e↵ects smaller that a $1499.26 or 9.6% of a standard
deviation decrease in net worth inclusive of housing and larger than a $8764.864 or 56.16%
increase in net worth inclusive of housing.
Table 7 reports regressions on the probability of stock ownership.12 In column 4, for
12I observe this variable in 1946-1951, 1952, and 1954.
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individuals ages 45-64, becoming covered by Social Security is related to an 8.4 percentage
point increase in the probability of owning stocks. This coe cient is marginally significant,
though the estimates using the entire sample are significant at the 95% level.
Though none of the point estimates presented here for individuals ages 45-64, the group
for which I would expect the expansions of Social Security would have the largest e↵ects, are
significantly di↵erent from zero at a 95% confidence levels, the e↵ects within 95% confidence
intervals are reasonably close to zero when considering the boundaries as percent of the
standard deviation of the underlying variable. It is possible that the coe cients estimated
in this section are biased towards zero if individuals in the later occupational expansion
anticipated that their occupation would become covered by Social Security prior to their
retirement, and therefore adjusted their behavior to future Social Security benefits before it
was legislated that they would receive benefits. Also, it is important to consider the degree
that I would observe changes in stocks of assets because stock variables move quite slowly
and therefore these coe cients are best thought of as qualitative descriptions.
4.2 1950 occupational expansion
Next, I focus on the 1950 occupational expansion because of it was one of the larger occu-
pational expansions and it allows me to focus on a smaller time period. As noted earlier,
although this expansion was large in terms of additional individuals covered nationwide, it
was the smallest in my dataset. This is perhaps because the discretionary choices I made
with occupation codes was mistaken or perhaps because this data was not representative of
the population. If the small proportion of individuals a↵ected treated is due to incorrect cod-
ing, my coe cients will be biased towards zero. First, I reestimate equation (1) restricting
my sample to the years 1946-53;   has the same interpretation as in the previous regressions.
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I also explore the Social Security expansion in a less parametric form by estimating
event studies. Here, I estimate the following regression:
outcomeisot = ✓t + ↵o +
X
t 6=049
 t1(year = t)t ⇥ 1(1950 expansion)ot + "isot (2)
and by examining the pattern in the  t coe cient, I estimate the e↵ect of the expansions
of savings. Here, 1(year = t) are dummy variables for each year t in the sample and
1(1950 expansion)ot is a dummy variable indicating whether an individual was in an occu-
pation covered by the 1950 occupational expansion of Social Security. I display the event
studies for individuals ages 45-64 without the inclusion of controls.13 In this regression, a
finding that the  t coe cients become more positive after 1949, this would suggest that
after becoming covered by Social Security, individuals increase their savings. Likewise, if
the  t coe cients become more negative after 1949 would suggest that individuals who be-
come covered by Social Security decrease their savings more relative to individuals whose
treatment status did not change.14
Critically, the event studies serve as a falsification test for the parallel trends assumption
needed for regression (1) to identify the causal e↵ect of Social Security on savings. If savings
of those who will be covered by Social Security are evolving on di↵erent trends to those
whose Social Security coverage status does not change prior to the change in coverage status
in 1950, this would suggest that the parallel trends assumption does not hold and that the  
estimates do not identify that causal e↵ect of receiving Social Security coverage on savings.
That is, prior to 1949 the  t coe cients should not be statistically di↵erent from zero if the
parallel trends assumption does hold.
Results from specification (1) are reported in Table 8 for those ages 45-64 after con-
13Event studies including those 25-64 are qualitatively similar.
14Event studies for the full sample are qualitatively similar to the event studies presented here.
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ditioning on a vector of controls. Other than the point estimate on net worth inclusive of
housing, each of these coe cients is more positive than the coe cient estimated using the
entire sample. In column (1), I estimate that being covered by Social Security is related to
a $929 increase in net worth exclusive of housing. Though this coe cient is four times as
large as the point estimate from the entire sample, the associated 95% confidence interval
is quite large; I can reject e↵ects of the phase in of Social Security outside of the interval
[ 1569.8, 3427.8], a far wider confidence interval than the interval associated with the first
point estimate. Given the decrease in sample size associated with only using years just
around the 1950 occupational expansion, it makes sense that the there would be a fall in
statistical power that would explain the larger confidence interval. Panel (a) of Figure 6
reports an event study from this regression. Observe that the  t coe cient prior to the
occupational expansion is not statistically di↵erent than zero which is suggestive that I have
not violated the parallel trends assumption. However, the  t coe cients after for the group
of occupations that received Social Security coverage after 1950 also are not statistically
di↵erent from zero after this group becomes covered by Social Security suggesting that there
is little detectable e↵ect of becoming covered by Social Security.
Though the coe cient on bonds increases to -84.3, which is 27% of the initial point
estimate in absolute value, the validity of this coe cient as a causal estimate is brought
into question by the event study for bonds shown in panel (d) of Figure 8. Here, the  (1947)
coe cient is nearly statistically di↵erent from zero at the 5% level, suggesting that the
changes in stocks of bonds for individuals whose Social Security coverage status changed in
1950 may have been evolving on di↵erential trends from those whose Social Security coverage
status did not change in 1950.
Concerns about violations of the parallel trends assumption are not as severe for net
worth inclusive of housing, panel (e) of Figure 6, though the changes in this coe cient after
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restricting to only years around the 1950 expansion are suggestive that this regression is
identifying something other than just the occupational expansion. The coe cient of net
worth inclusive of housing decreases by a factor of four after restricting the sample to just
the years around the 1950 occupational expansion; my initial estimate of a $3632.8 dollar
increase in net worth inclusive of housing associated with becoming covered by Social Security
falls to there being a $890.6 dollar increase in net worth inclusive of housing associated with
becoming covered by Social Security. This fall in point estimate is contrary to the increase
in point estimates in the other coe cients when restricted to the 1950 expansion; a potential
explanation for this fall in point estimate is that the initial point estimate was influenced by
some other variable leading to an increase in net worth inclusive of housing.
4.3 Liquid Asset Flows
I next present regression results from liquid asset flows during the period of 1947-1951.15 As
previously discussed, I use liquid asset flows because flows of liquid assets might respond more
quickly than stocks of liquid assets meaning I might be able to find an e↵ect here that I could
not identify when using the stock variables. The use of flows also follows the recent literature
on this question (Attanasio and Rowhedder, 2003. Attanasio and Brugiavini, 2003). In the
odd numbered column of Tables 8-9, I present regression results from the entire sample of
45-64 year olds and in even numbered columns of Tables 8-9, I present regression results
after restricting this sample to exclude those in the 1st and 99th percentile of liquid asset
flows.
In column 2 of Table 9, I estimate that becoming covered by Social Security is related
to a $174 flow into liquid assets. Though this estimate is 50% larger than the mean liquid
15Ideally I would use a larger period of flows of liquid assets, but these are the only years for which this
variable is available in the SCF
24
asset flow during his time period, it is only 3.2% of a standard deviation in liquid asset flows
indicating that this e↵ect is not relatively large. I can reject e↵ects at a 95% confidence
interval outside of the range of [ 222.21, 570.808] or e↵ects between -6.5% to 16% of a
standard deviation. If receiving Social Security coverage were associated with a change in
flows of liquid assets shifting an individual 16% of a standard deviation, this would not be
economically insignificant, though it is likely that an e↵ect that large is in the confidence
interval because of a lack of power in these calculations.
In column 4, I estimate that becoming covered by Social Security is related to a 10%
increase in holdings of liquid assets. Though on the face of it, the magnitude of this change is
quite large, the 10 percent increase in flow as share of stock was imprecisely estimated–I can
reject e↵ects at the 95% level outside more extreme than a 23% decline or a 44% increase in
percentage liquid asset flow. Because of the width of this confidence interval, I am hesitant
to attribute much meaning at all to the point estimate. Because the variability of the liquid
asset flow variable makes it di cult to interpret e↵ects of liquid asset flows using these two
variables, next I turn to two di↵erent measures of flows of liquid assets that reduce the
variability in the dependent variable.
Table 10 reports three blunter measures of liquid asset flows; the first measures the
probability of having positive liquid asset flows, the second measures variation in the per-
centile distribution of assets across years, and the third measures liquid asset flows as a share
of income. Here, I estimate, in column 2, that being covered by Social Security is related to
a 2 percentage point decline in the probability of having a positive flow on liquid assets. 58%
of the sample during this period has a positive flow of liquid assets, so the Social Security
expansion is related to a 3% decline in the probability of an individual having a positive flow
of liquid assets. However, this coe cient was estimated very imprecisely, I can only reject
e↵ects more negative than a 33 percentage point decline in the probability of having positive
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flows and e↵ects more positive than a 29 percentage point increase probability of having a
positive flow in liquid assets being associated with receiving Social Security coverage. Hence,
at either extreme, I can reject e↵ects larger than a 55% decline in the probability of having
a positive flow of liquid assets or a 49% increase in the probability of having a positive flow
of liquid assets. Because of the width of this confidence interval and the share of individu-
als who have no liquid asset flows, I am hesitant to attribute much meaning to this point
estimate.
In column 4 of Table 10, I examine e↵ects of the Social Security expansion on indi-
viduals’ place in the 1949 percentile distribution of liquid asset flows; there I estimate that
becoming covered by Social Security in 1950 is associated with falling 2.06 percentile points
in the 1949 percentile distribution of liquid asset flows. I can build a 95% confidence interval
around this coe cient and reject e↵ects of the Social Security expansion more extreme than
a 12.12 percentile point decrease or a 8.01 percentile point increase. That is, for the mean
level of liquid asset flows, I can reject e↵ects outside of an individuals shifting to below the
36th percentile and above the 57th percentile which are both zero in the 1949 distribution
of liquid asset flows. Hence this estimate is a precise zero, suggesting the phase in of Social
Security has no e↵ect on liquid asset flows.
In column 6 of Table 10, I report regression results using liquid asset flows as a percent
of total earnings as the dependent variable. Here, I estimate that becoming covered by Social
Security is related to a 24 percent increase in flow as share of total income implying that
individuals save a higher share of their income. I can reject e↵ects of less that an 9% decrease
and more than a 40% increase in flow as share of total income at a 95% confidence level. I
consider the point estimates in columns 4 and 6 to be the most compelling estimates using
liquid asset flows. I do not attribute too much meaning to the statistical significance of the
point estimates in columns 5-6 because of multiple testing.
26
Again when using flows of liquid assets as the dependent variable, I do not gain enough
statistical power to reject zero e↵ects at conventional levels. Two of the point estimates in
this series of regressions were again positive, one of the more persuasive estimates in this
section was a precise zero and the other estimate was positive. Because the pattern of point
of point estimates contradict the majority of the literature on the e↵ect of Social Security on
savings as well as the simple model I previously presented, in the next section, I will explore
in more detail theoretical explanations of the positive point estimates before empirically
exploring one explanation.
4.4 Possible Explanations for Positive E↵ects
As I briefly discussed in the introduction, it is theoretically possible that the creation and
phase-in of the Social Security system would have led to an increase in savings. This could
have happened for a number of reasons. In her book, The E↵ect of Social Security on Private
Savings, Alicia Munnell proposes a number of ways that the phase-in of Social Security
could have led to an increase in savings. Munnell first postulates that the phase-in of Social
Security may have led to a higher aggregate level of savings in the economy. This is because
the creation of Social Security influences high savers and low savers di↵erently. If high savers
substituted dollar for dollar their Social Security income for private savings, previously low
savers would be forced to save more than they previously did after becoming covered by Social
Security because Social Security payments were garnished from their paychecks. Someone
who saved zero dollars prior to Social Security was forced to increase her saving to something
akin to the level of her garnished wage. Hence, Social Security may well increase the total
amount of private retirement savings in the economy.
Munnell also provides other explanations of how Social Security, or other forced-savings
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plans, could lead to an increase in private savings. Forced-savings plans such as Social
Security lead to a recognition e↵ect, by which participants in the program are reminded of
the importance of retirement savings and therefore increase their level of savings outside of
the program (Cagan, 1965). Forced-savings plans such as Social Security also increase goal
feasibility of savings; Social Security can bring individuals closer to their retirement savings
goal that may have seemed infeasible prior to Social Security. Because individuals are closer
to these savings goals as a result of Social Security, they are more likely to increase their
private savings by the smaller amount to reach their actual savings goals (Katona, 1964).
Another reason that Social Security may have led to increased retirement savings is
that Social Security, with its promise of a funded retirement, could have caused fundamental
changes in intergenerational relationships. The passage of the 1935 Social Security Act
may have led to changes in cultural expectation; prior to Social Security, children provided
housing and care for their parents after retirement. Because of the comprehensive government
support for the aged, the Social Security program could have conceivably led to an increase
in private savings because individuals needed to fund their own retirements, independent of
their children (Costa, 1999). Social Security also could have induced positive savings as it
depressed the labor supply of the aged, extending retirements, leading to individuals needing
to have more savings (Fetter, 2016).
Finally, Social Security could have created an increase in private savings because it was
not introduced in an environment free of public old-age support. Rather, Social Security
payments were phased in on top of the already existing means-tested Old Age Assistance
(OAA) payments. There is a some empirical evidence that the existence of means-tested
programs reduced private savings (Neumark, 1998).
OAA was a state based means-tested program that brought retirees’ incomes up to a
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state income floor. Each state set a specific income floor and set particular guidelines about
exactly who would be eligible to receive OAA. Because income from Social Security counted
against the income component of the means test, it taxed away individuals’ OAA benefits
dollar for dollar. In Figure 7, I show how OAA payments related to the phase in of Social
Security. In this figure, I plot the average OAA payment per person above age 65 in a given
state in 1949 against the di↵erence in OAA payments per person between 1960 and 1949.
Here, there is a strong downward trend, suggesting that the higher the OAA per person
payment in 1949, the lower the 1960 OAA payment relative to this underlying level. That
is, the phase in of Social Security in this time period substituted for OAA dollars in high
OAA states. This phenomenon was discussed in both general circulation newspapers and
Social Security Bulletins.
Because Social Security impacted people di↵erent in di↵erent states based on the under-
lying levels of OAA, it is plausible that Social Security could have had a more positive e↵ect
on individuals in states with generous OAA because any disincentive to save from Social
Security is less strong than a disincentive to save from OAA. This is because OAA dollars
were means-tested and asset-tested while Social Security dollars were not asset-tested. That
is, if individuals in those states chose not to save because they wanted to receive OAA in
retirement, once Social Security payments brought them over the OAA means-test, they
were no longer disincentivized from saving by OAA because increased savings no longer cost
them future old age benefits. I will test for heterogeneity in response to the phase in of
Social Security in this next specification.
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4.5 Phase in of Social Security along with OAA
This next specification explores the interaction between Social Security and OAA. Here,
I investigate whether there were heterogenous e↵ects to receiving Social Security coverage
based on underlying levels of OAA. To investigate this, I first estimate a di↵erenced regression
interacting being treated by the Social Security expansion with a dummy variable for being
above the median OAA per person payment in 1949 as follows:
outcomeisot = ✓t + ↵o +  s+ (3)X
t 6=1949
⌧t1(year = t)t ⇥OAA in 1949s +
X
o
 o1(occ = o)⇥ (OAA in 1949)s+
11(treat)iot + 21(treat)iot ⇥ 1(OAA in 1949)s + x⇣ + "isot
As before, ✓t and ↵o are year and occupation fixed e↵ects, 1(treat)iot is a dummy
variable indicating whether the individual was in an occupation covered by Social Security
by time t, and x is the same vector of controls.  s is a vector of state fixed e↵ects which I
include in the place of a dummy variable for each each state’s level of OAA per person above
the age of 65 in 1949. (OAA in 1949) is a continuous variable that measures the level of
OAA per person above the age of 65 in state s in 1949.
In estimating this regression, I take the identification assumption from specification (1)
as given. Here, the sign of 2 is suggestive of how the underlying level of OAA in a state
was related how individuals adjusted their savings in response to becoming covered by Social
Security. That is, 2 measures how individuals in states with higher underlying OAA levels
change their savings in response to the phase in of Social Security relative to individuals in
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states with lower underlying levels of OAA. Though out of sample, 1 of this specification
estimates the e↵ect of the phase in of Social Security as if the average state level of OAA
in 1949 were zero dollars, something akin to Social Security being phased into an economy
without preexisting old age support.
Results from these regressions are reported in Table 11. Observe that the coe cients
on the majority of the interaction terms, the 2 coe cients, in this table are negative and
statistically insignificant. If these point estimates were statistically significant, this conceiv-
able would be evidence against the hypothesis that the positive point estimates previously
estimated were in part due to the lighter savings disincentive from Social Security relative to
OAA but because they are not significant, these estimates are neither evidence for or against
this explanation of positive point estimates.
In column (1) of Table 11, I estimate that for a state with zero dollars of 1949 OAA,
becoming covered by Social Security is related to a $596 increase holdings in net worth,
exclusive of housing. Note that this coe cient is more than two and a half times the
estimated e↵ect was in Table 1 where I did not allow for heterogenous treatment e↵ects
from underlying OAA levels. In this specification, 2 =  5.1, so each additional dollar of
1949 OAA is related to a $5.5 greater decrease in non-housing net worth. The mean level of
1949 OAA per person above age 65 is $77, so the e↵ect of the Social Security expansion for
this state would be a $171.43 increase in non-housing net worth.
The other interpretations are largely similar to the interpretation of 1 and 2 on net
worth exclusive of housing. Because coe cients from this specification are not statistically
di↵erent from zero, they do not provide evidence against the theory that a reason that there
may have been positive e↵ects of Social Security on private savings due to the underlying
di↵erences in the nature of old age support in di↵erent states. That said, the signs on the
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point estimate of the 2 coe cients is suggestive of evidence to the contrary, though the
magnitudes of the coe cients due suggest that the regressions specification may pick up on
factors than the Social Security expansion because the magnitude of e↵ects are so large.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, I contribute to the literature estimating the e↵ect of the phase-in of Social
Security on savings through leveraging the occupational expansions from the phase in of
Social Security. I find a consistent pattern of positive and statistically insignificant points
estimates; interpreting these point estimates at face value would contradict the majority of
the literature, which finds negative e↵ects of savings associated with increasing generosity of
Social Security benefits. However, unlike the majority of the literature, I leverage the origins
of the Social Security system which di↵ers from more recent expansions or contractions.
The creation and expansions of the Social Security program could have changed the way
individuals financed retirement in ways that would shift towards individuals wanting to save
more in ways that expanding benefits in an already existent system would not do. I tested
the possibility that the phase-in of Social Security would lead to positive savings because of
heterogeneity in a preexisting means-tested old age support program with stronger savings
disincentives than Social Security, but find no e↵ect. In future work, I hope to better
understand the occupational expansions and use more detail about OAA programs within
states. I will also investigate other specifications for the e↵ect of the phase in of Social
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7 Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics for Liquid Asset Flows
mean st. dev p25 p75 min max
liquid asset flow 70.34 3376.79 -184.23 201.06 -42658.82 82881.24
percent flow of stock .019 1.52 -.27 .08 -3.70 60
positive flow .58 .49 0 1 0 1
percentile 49 49.30 30.78 22 78 1 99
percent flow of income -.10 3.04 -.046 .039 -199.87 7.07
Note: This table reports summary statistics for liquid asset flows. The sample is restricted to those ages
45-64 and is weighted using weights provided in the SCF. Liquid asset flows were available for years
1947-1951. p25 stands for the 25th percentile. p75 stands for the 75th percentile.
Table 2: E↵ect of Social Security on Non-Housing Net Worth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
net worth nh net worth nh net worth nh net worth nh
SS Covered 183.3 417.8 75.23 230.2
(316.4) (221.6) (299.7) (264.0)
N 24803 10534 24473 10374
r2 0.0273 0.0418 0.0412 0.0606
controls None None Yes Yes
ages 25-64 45-64 25-64 45-64
Note: Regression results for specification 1. Includes the years 1946-1959, 1962-1963. Regressions weighted
using weights provided in the SCF. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the occupation level. ⇤:
p < 0.10, ⇤⇤: p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤: p < 0.01
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Table 3: E↵ect of Social Security on Liquid Assets
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Liquid Assets Liquid Assets Liquid Assets Liquid Assets
SS Covered 77.35 409.1 -22.64 231.4
(133.8) (324.9) (122.8) (268.5)
N 30548 12012 30076 11817
r2 0.0471 0.0541 0.0639 0.0755
controls None None Yes Yes
ages 25-64 45-64 25-64 45-64
Note: Regression results from specification (1). Includes 1946-1959, 1962-1963. Regressions weighted using
weights provided in the SCF. Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the occupation level. ⇤ p < 0.05,
⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
Table 4: E↵ect of Social Security on Saving and Checking
(1) (2) (3) (4)
saving and checking saving and checking saving and checking saving and checking
SS Covered -85.93 260.6 -151.0 132.8
(143.1) (159.8) (139.8) (170.0)
N 30388 11921 29917 11727
r2 0.0341 0.0464 0.0446 0.0626
controls None None Yes Yes
ages 25-64 45-64 25-64 45-64
Note: Regression results for specification (1). Includes 1946-1959, 1962-1963. Regressions weighted using
weights provided in the SCF. Standard errors in parenthesis and clustered at the occupation level. ⇤:
p < 0.10, ⇤⇤: p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤: p < 0.01
Table 5: E↵ect of Social Security on Bonds
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bonds Bonds Bonds Bonds
SS Covered -156.7 -252.0 -190.2 -312.2
(145.5) (194.3) (142.3) (201.3)
N 30538 12007 30067 11813
r2 0.0303 0.0389 0.0414 0.0550
controls None None Yes Yes
ages 25-64 45-64 25-64 45-64
Note: Regression results for specification 1. Includes 1946-1959, 1962-1963. Regressions weighted using
weights provided in the SCF. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the occupation level. ⇤: p < 0.10,
⇤⇤: p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤: p < 0.01
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Table 6: E↵ect of Social Security on Net Worth with Housing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
net worth h net worth h net worth h net worth h
SS Covered 3070.0 4006.6 2884.1 3632.8
(2093.0) (2524.0) (2055.4) (2618.4)
N 22687 9621 22397 9481
r2 0.0692 0.0855 0.0888 0.123
controls None None Yes Yes
ages 25-64 45-64 25-64 45-64
Note: Regression results for specification (1). Includes 1946-1959, 1962-1963. Regressions weighted using
weights provided in the SCF. Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the occupation level. ⇤: p < 0.10,
⇤⇤: p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤: p < 0.01
Table 7: E↵ect of Social Security on Stock Ownership
(1) (2) (3) (4)
owns stocks owns stocks owns stocks owns stocks
SS Covered 0.0929⇤⇤ 0.0934⇤ 0.0894⇤⇤ 0.0846⇤
(0.0291) (0.0336) (0.0274) (0.0357)
N 15802 5734 15533 5636
r2 0.0616 0.0791 0.0844 0.117
controls None None Yes Yes
ages 25-64 45-64 25-64 45-64
Note: Regression results for specification 1. Includes 1946-1951, 1952, 1954. Regressions weighted using
weights provided in the SCF. Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the occupation level. ⇤: p < 0.10,
⇤⇤: p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤: p < 0.01
Table 8: E↵ect of 1950 Occupational Expansion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
networth nh liqassets save check sum bonds networth h stockown 1
treat 929.0 976.2 1048.4 -84.30 890.6 0.126
(1274.9) (1180.3) (1165.8) (139.9) (1243.2) (0.0684)
N 5317 6644 6643 6641 4424 4733
r2 0.0624 0.105 0.0885 0.0638 0.130 0.111
Note: Regression results for specification (1). All models include years 1946-1953, are restricted to those
ages 45-64, and include a vector of controls. Regressions are weighted using weights from the SCF.
Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the occupation level. ⇤: p < 0.10, ⇤⇤: p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤: p < 0.01
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Table 9: Liquid Asset Flows
(1) (2) (3) (4)
liquid asset flow liquid asset flow flow as pct stock flow as pct stock
SS Covered 284.4 174.3 0.0745 0.102
(268.9) (202.2) (0.177) (0.174)
N 4795 4736 2293 2273
r2 0.0132 0.0154 0.00689 0.00597
controls None Yes None Yes
exclusion None 1st 99th pctile None 1st 99th pctile
Note: Regression results from specification (1). Includes years 1947-1951 and restricted to those ages 45-64.
Weighted using weights from the SCF. Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the occupation level.




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1: A Two Period Model For Social Security
Note: This figure is a two-period model for actuarially fair Social Security.
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1940 1950 1960 1970
Year
OASI per person 65+ OAA per person 65+
OAA and OASI growth
Note: This figure shows the growth of OAA and OASI across time. From 1925-1935, OAA payments are
from Parker (1936). From 1936 onward, OAA payments are from Carter et. al. (2006). OASI payments
are from Carter et. al. (2006). Red lines are across years 1950, 1954, 1956, mark the years of occupational
expansions in OASI that I use in this study.
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1945 1950 1955 1960 1965
year
share owning stocks: ages 25−64
(f) mean=.1 stdev=.3
Note: This figure shows the means and standard deviations of dependent variables restricted to ages 25-64.
These figures are weighted using weights provided in the Survey on Consumer Finances. Note that the years
1960 and 1961 are excluded because weights for 1960 are missing and variables for 1961 are missing. See
text for variable definitions.
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1945 1950 1955 1960 1965
year
share who attended college: ages 25−64
(d)
Note: This figure shows means and standard deviations of variables used in a vector of controls in some
regressions. These figures are weighted using weights provided in the Survey of Consumer Finances. This
figure is restricted to those ages 25-64. Note that the years 1960 and 1961 are excluded from this figure as
they are excluded from the analysis.
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1945 1950 1955 1960 1965
year
always covered covered in 1950
covered in 1954 covered in 1956
share covered by each expansion by year
Note: Share of people in occupations covered by particular occupational expansion by year. This figure is
restricted to those ages 25-64.
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Occupational expansion announced in 1950










1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953
year
Occupational expansion announced in 1950
owns stocks event study 2
(f)
Note: Figures show point estimate and 95% confidence interval from interaction terms of dummy variables for
year with a dummy variable for whether an individual was in an occupation covered by the 1950 occupation
expansion from specification 2. The sample is restricted to those ages 45-64 and regressions are weighted
using weights provided in the SCF.
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0 50 100 150 200 250
OAA per person 65+ in 1949
Change in OAA payments by underlying OAA
Note: This figure shows OAA payment per person above the age of 65 in 1949 against the di↵erence in OAA
per person between 1960 and 1949. OAA payments are reported in 1960 dollars. Data on OAA payments
from Carter et. al. 2006.
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